

Psychology and Security

Demotivating Persistent Attackers

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HOW DO YOU
ENGAGE WITH
ATTACKERS
WHILE
UNDER ATTACK?

HOW DO YOU
KNOW YOU
ARE UNDER

ATTACK

IN THE FIRST PLACE?



0

Imitation attacks and attacker sophistication

1

The economics of attacks

2

Flipping the economics in your favor

3

Case Studies

IN THE BEGINNING,
ACCESS
WAS GIVEN TO
EVERYONE &
EVERYTHING



THE MORE WALLS
WE PUT UP

THE HARDER IT
BECAME TO TELL
HUMANS AND
ATTACKERS APART





PLEASE
CLOSE
GATE

TO AFFECT BEHAVIOR,
YOU NEED TO
REMOVE THE

INCENTIVE

MANUAL ATTACKS

Sufficient when
value is high



Can't scale when value
per attack is reduced



AUTOMATED ATTACKS


Sufficient when
value is low



Can't scale when cost
per attack is increased



THE SECRET TO DEFEATING ATTACKERS




Decrease value



Increase cost

THE SECRET TO HAPPY USERS



Increase value



Decrease cost

0 Attacker sophistication & where we are



1 The economics of attacks

2 Flipping the economics in your favor

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Attack Detail: Credential Stuffing

FROM DATA BREACH TO DAMAGE



Outside your control



Within your control





Your web applications and APIs
are the battlefield.

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

cre·den·tial stuff·ing

/krə'den(t)SHəl 'stəfɪŋ/

The automated replay of breached username/password pairs across many sites in order to take over accounts where passwords have been reused.

A STEP BY STEP GUIDE

1

Get Credentials

2

Automate Login

3

Defeat Automation Defenses














4

Distribute Globally

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

1


1. Get Credentials

	Email:Password 500K Combo Mixed [EMAIL:PASS] (Netflix, Fortnite, PornHub, Spotify, Crunyro by geroZ
	Email:Password 100K GMAIL Combos[EMAIL:PASS] (Spotify, Deezer, Crunchy, Netflix, uPlay, St by xanoob
	Kayo.moe by jafo
	Email:Password 84k FR Hq Combolist (Music,Shopping,Spotify) 11 Oct 2018 by mzcombo
	User:Password 100k User pass Sqli Paid HQ Combolist (Streaming Sites) 11 Oct 2018 by mzcombo
	Email:Password 572k USA HQ Combolist (Spotify,Netflix,Vpn,Uplay) 11 Oct 2018 by mzcombo
	Email:Password 35k Indian Combo List Private HQ Combo List [1 2] by RuwanMax
	Email:Password [EMAIL:PASS] 401K HQ Combo [Minecraft, VPN, Fortnite, Netflix, Spotify, Por by olando
	Email:Password 215K HQ Combo [Email:Pass][Minecraft, VPN, Fortnite, Netflix, Spotify, Porn by geroZ
	Email:Password [EMAIL:PASS] 340K HQ Combo [Minecraft, VPN, Fortnite, Netflix, Spotify, P by xanoob
	Email:Password [EMAIL:PASS] 340K HQ Combo [Minecraft, VPN, Fortnite, Netflix, Spotify, P by xanoob
	Email:Password 312K HQ Combo [Email:Pass][Minecraft, VPN, Fortnite, Netflix, Spotify, Porn by olando
	Email:Password 312K HQ Combo [Email:Pass][Minecraft, VPN, Fortnite, Netflix, Spotify, Porn by olando

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

2


1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login



CREDENTIAL STUFFING

2


1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login



CREDENTIAL STUFFING

2

1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login



CREDENTIAL STUFFING

3

1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses



I'm not a robot



reCAPTCHA

[Privacy](#) - [Terms](#)

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reCAPTCHA

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

3



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Best CAPTCHA Solver Bypass Service

With Death by Captcha you can solve any CAPTCHA. All you need to do is implement our API, pass us your CAPTCHAs and we'll return the text. It's that easy!

Please note that our services should be used only for research projects and any illegal use of our services is strictly prohibited. Any bypass and CAPTCHA violations should be reported to help@deathbycaptcha.com

Death By Captcha Offers:

- Starting from an incredible low price of **\$1.39** (\$0.99 for **Gold Members** !) for **1000** solved CAPTCHAs.
- A hybrid system composed of the most advanced OCR system on the market, along with a 24/7 team of CAPTCHA solvers.

STATUS: OK

Average solving time 1 minute ago: 10 sec
5 minutes ago: 11 sec
15 minutes ago: 11 sec
Today's average accuracy rate: 90.5 %
(updated every minute)

Create a FREE account

Log In

Log In

Create a FREE account

1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

3

Google Webmaster Central Blog

Official news on crawling and indexing sites for the Google index

Introducing reCAPTCHA v3: the new way to stop bots

Monday, October 29, 2018

1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

3

1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses



[DASHBOARD](#) [API](#) [Software](#) [StartWork](#) [FAQ](#) [Stat](#)

Solving ReCaptcha V3

2018-06-22 19:02:18


ReCaptcha V3

We've been solving ReCaptcha V3 for 3 weeks and are now ready to sh

CREDENTIAL STUFFING

4

1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
4. Distribute



CREDENTIAL STUFFING

1 Combolists starting at \$0

2 \$50 per site configuration

3 \$1.39 per 1000 CAPTCHAs

4 \$2 for 1000 global IPs

Less than \$200
for 100,000 ATO
attempts

0 Attacker sophistication & where we are

1 The economics of attacks



2 Flipping the economics in your favor


3 Case Studies

DETECTION




VS

MITIGATION






Have multiple ways to detect bad actors




Also have ways to detect when they've started to pry open your systems

TARGET WHAT HURTS THE MOST



It's not as simple as blocking a baddie.
You need to target what will hurt the most.

THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE




What tools work, what don't?
What URLs need to be targeted?
What dark web data do I need?

THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE




Investment in a framework of choice.
Custom development against a site.
Building in proxy/botnet hooks.


THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE




THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE



THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE



THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE



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Case Study 1



Damaging Reputation

Scenario




Well funded
scraper




Big US Bank

The actor cycled through the softest targets




Finally committed to one to dive deeper




The threat found prolonged success on iOS due to version lag

Got around defenses regularly, though not durably



Recognizing patterns in behavior




Analysis

- 1 Regular working schedule
- 2 Actor's consumers were notified upon success
- 3 Failure was met with downstream frustration
- 4 Prolonged failure provoked distress

Plan of action

- 1 Target defense out of working schedule
- 2 Turn on defenses when damage would be highest
- 3 Turn off primary mitigation during working schedule
- 4 Cycle through defenses even when still working

Case Study 2



Github Kiddies

Scenario



Credential Stuffer
and Account taker-overer





Big US Retailer




We were down to a fraction of our normal ability to detect
We needed more data

We had enough of a grip to deliver a targeted payload





This allowed us to inspect the retooling effort in real time



```
> function doBadStuff() {  
    if (iCanHazAccounts) {  
        stealAllAccounts();  
    } else {  
        injectMaliciousScripts();  
    }  
}
```

What we learned



Analysis

- 1 Actor was a competent developer
- 2 Still relied on community to get around problems
- 3 Bypassed defenses via trial and error
- 4 Actor was been lucky, not wildly skilled

Plan of action

- 1 Build up defenses based on the tool he was using
- 2 Provide variable feedback during retooling phase
- 3 Turn on just enough to be infuriating. No more, no less
- 4 Create new countermeasures that act differently during retooling phase


Recap

- 1 Treat detection and mitigation separately.
- 2 Protect the data used to detect.
- 3 Understand what is incentivizing your attackers.
- 4 Work with product to build app-level defenses.

“ *Tactics* is knowing what to do when there is something to do.

Strategy is knowing what to do when there is nothing to do. ”

- Savielly Tartakower



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